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The psychosocial response to a terrorist 
attack at Manchester Arena, 2017: a process 
evaluation
Daniel Hind1* , Kate Allsopp2,3, Prathiba Chitsabesan4,5 and Paul French6,7
Abstract 
Background: A 2017 terrorist attack in Manchester, UK, affected large numbers of adults and young people. Dur-
ing the response phase (first seven weeks), a multi-sector collaborative co-ordinated a decentralised response. In the 
subsequent recovery phase they implemented a centralised assertive outreach programme, ‘The Resilience Hub’, to 
screen and refer those affected. We present a process evaluation conducted after 1 year.
Methods: Case study, involving a logic modelling approach, aggregate routine data, and semi-structured interviews 
topic guides based on the Inter-Agency Collaboration Framework and May’s Normalisation Process Theory. Leaders 
from health, education and voluntary sectors (n = 21) and frontline Resilience Hub workers (n = 6) were sampled for 
maximum variation or theoretically, then consented and interviewed. Framework analysis of transcripts was under-
taken by two researchers.
Results: Devolved government, a collaborative culture, and existing clinical networks meant that, in the response 
phase, a collaboration was quickly established between health and education. All but one leader evaluated the 
response positively, although they were not involved in pre-disaster statutory planning. However, despite overwhelm-
ing positive feedback there were clear difficulties. (1) Some voluntary sector colleagues felt that it took some time for 
them to be involved. (2) Other VCSE organisations were accused of inappropriate, harmful use of early intervention. 
(3) The health sector were accused of overlooking those below the threshold for clinical treatment. (4) There was a 
perception that there were barriers to information sharing across organisations, which was particularly evident in rela-
tion to attempts to outreach to first responders and other professionals who may have been affected by the incident. 
(5) Hub workers encountered barriers to referring people who live outside of Greater Manchester. After 1 year of the 
recovery phase, 877 children and young people and 2375 adults had completed screening via the Resilience Hub, 
79% of whom lived outside Greater Manchester.
Conclusions: The psychosocial response to terrorist attacks and other contingencies should be planned and 
practiced before the event, including reviews of communications, protocols, data sharing procedures and workforce 
capacity. Further research is needed to understand how the health and voluntary sectors can best collaborate in the 
wake of future incidents.
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Background
Recent mass casualty incidents
Whilst mass casualty events are uncommon, the number 
of transnational terrorist attacks has increased globally 
[1] (Table 1). Those physically present at a terror attack 
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have a 33–39% of developing post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD) within 1 year, with 17–29% of those close 
to the injured, 5–6% of emergency and recovery workers 
and 4% of local communities similarly affected [2]. Chil-
dren are particularly vulnerable [3, 4]. The economic bur-
den of mental health care may equal the medical costs [5] 
with considerable unmet need [6].
Guidance for responding to mass casualty incidents
The central theme of the literature on such events is the 
need for a phased response (Table 2) [7, 8]. In this paper, 
we follow a widely-used seven-step model for designing 
and implementing any psychosocial response (Table  2) 
[8]. The preparedness phase should involve multi-agency 
planning, training, and the development of commu-
nity resilience [8]. The response phase, typically the first 
4–6  weeks after a disaster, requires universal and selec-
tive psychosocial support based on the principles of psy-
chological first aid [9]. Assessments identify people with 
unmet psychosocial and mental health needs, signpost 
support services, monitor distress, or refer for individu-
alised psychological interventions as appropriate [9]. In 
the subsequent recovery phase, primary care and special-
ist services should identify those who are still distressed, 
or have developed difficulties later on [8], providing evi-
dence-based psychological interventions [9]. Preventive 
and therapeutic approaches are intended to reduce long-
term, complex difficulties.
Different recovery trajectories have been observed 
following single-incident trauma [10, 11]. Up to 70% of 
people may experience mild to moderate distress but not 
require formal psychological interventions, particularly 
if they receive adequate early support [8]. Others have 
a deteriorating response, with the potential to develop 
long-term difficulties, or an initial high stress response 
that may or may not improve over time [8]. Delayed dis-
tress may also be experienced [10]. First responders and 
members of clinical care teams may be directly or vicari-
ously traumatised, but rarely seek help [12–15], with 
observed PTSD rates of 8–26% dependent on exposure 
and pre-incident training [16–18]. As a result of these 
differing trajectories, the guidance advocates a stepped 
care approach, screens and triages individuals [19]. Low-
level interventions suffice for most survivors [20], and 
formal psychological interventions should only be deliv-
ered when there is clinical need [21]. The evaluation of 
screening models [22] particularly those aimed at chil-
dren and young people [23], remains a research priority.
The national and regional policy context
The 1991–2002 NHS reforms separated purchasers 
and providers to engender competition [24, 25], a pol-
icy known to make inter-agency collaboration more 
Table 1 Mass casualty incidents discussed in the text
Location Date Details
London, UK 7 July 2005 London transport system bombings [111–113]
Bardo, Tunisia 18 March 2015 Mass shooting, Bardo National Museum [79–81]
Sousse, Tunisia 26 June 2015 Mass shooting, Port El Kantaoui resort [79–81]
Paris, France 13 November 2015 Mass shootings/bombing around the city [81–83]
Brussels, Belgium 19 March 2016 Bombings, Brussels airport, Maalbeek metro station [81, 114]
Manchester, UK 22 May 2017 Manchester Arena bombing [35, 86]
London, UK 3 June 2017 Vehicle ramming/stabbing, London Bridge [85]
London, UK 14 June 2017 Grenfell Tower fire [3, 86]
Table 2 The strategic, seven-step model of community care
Phase Activity [8]
Preparedness phase (pre-event) 1. Strategic planning, mitigation and preparation
2. Public prevention programmes to develop communities
Response phase (first 4–6 weeks) and continuing 3. Universal and selective psychosocial interventions
4. Community support and development
Recovery phase (ideally from 4–6 weeks; in this project, from 7 weeks) 5. Monitoring and signposting for people in need to 
welfare, health and social care services
6. Augmented primary health and social care
7. Specialist mental healthcare
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difficult [26] In 2015, health and social care spending was 
devolved to the Greater Manchester (GM) Health and 
Social Care Partnership (HSCP) [27], an organisation 
jointly run by the NHS and local government [27, 28]. 
The HSCP aims to integrate services by bringing together 
representatives of ten local authorities, 12 Clinical Com-
missioning Groups (CCGs) [29, 30], 15 NHS care pro-
vider organisations and NHS England (NHSE)—the body 
which oversees NHS budget, planning, commission-
ing and delivery from 2013 [31, 32]. Another important 
regional organisation was the Strategic Clinical Network 
(SCN), set up by NHS England (NHSE) to provide clini-
cal leadership to improve health and care services [33, 
34].
Overview of the psychosocial response to the Arena 
bombing
On 22 May 2017, a suicide bomber detonated an impro-
vised explosive device in the foyer of Manchester Arena 
after a concert, killing 22 people and himself, and physi-
cally injuring 239 children and adults [35]. No prepara-
tion had been conducted for the mental health response 
to such a contingency (planning phase). In the response 
and recovery phases, the approach was: (a) universal; 
involving public health messages to reach anyone vicari-
ously traumatised; (b) targeted; approaching those known 
to be directly affected; and (c) phased; recognising differ-
ent communication and treatment needs across phases, 
with some survivors requiring long-term support [8, 36, 
37].
In the response phase, a multi-sector collabora-
tion shared universal messages (Table  2, Step 3). These 
included normalisation of distressing symptoms (such as 
shock, intrusive thoughts, sleep problems, etc.) [38, 39], 
and encouraged appropriate help-seeking. The informa-
tion advised against non-evidence-based early therapy or 
‘debriefing’, which is known to cause harm. Early on, some 
people who had been directly or vicariously affected by 
the incident were locally assessed and referred for spe-
cialist treatment according to risk and clinical need and 
on a non-systematic basis. Community support (Step 4) 
was provided through consultation with local schools, 
colleges, the media and group events, including psychoe-
ducation and information about support on offer. Social 
cohesion was emphasised, to encourage mutual support 
and prevent reactive hate crime.
The ‘Manchester Resilience Hub’, a collaboration 
between four NHS mental health trusts in GM, was was 
set up in response to the Arena attack, during the recov-
ery phase. Its overarching aim was—and remains—to 
reduce distress and minimise development of mental 
health difficulties, including post-traumatic sympotms, 
in the wake of the incident. The hub involves an assertive 
screen-and-refer outreach model [40], to systematically 
screen people of all ages, across the UK and beyond, with 
a stepped-care approach, tailoring treatment pathways 
to the needs of different individuals and groups [20, 41]. 
Those in need were initially identified by an email sent 
to concert ticket buyers, and are still referred, via pro-
motion of the screening programme though traditional 
and social media, as well as approaches to professionals 
through occupational health departments (see below, 
Results | Implementation actions). At the hub, clinicians 
use an online screening tool incorporating online psy-
chological measures, completed upon registration with 
the Hub, supplemented by telephone contact to assess 
need and triage [21, 42]. Invitations to repeat the screen-
ing are sent every 3 months.
Adult measures include the Trauma Screening Ques-
tionnaire [43], Generalised Anxiety Disorder 7 [44], 
Patient Health Questionnaire [45], and the Work and 
Social Adjustment Scale [46]. Children and Young Peo-
ple’s (CYP) measures include the Children’s Impact of 
Event scale [47], and subscales of the Revised Children’s 
Anxiety and Depression Scale [48] for depression, gen-
eralised anxiety disorder and separation anxiety. Estab-
lished clinical thresholds are used to triage respondents; 
the most severe score is given priority where there is dis-
agreement across measures. Adults at low risk are given 
normalisation messages and advice; those with moder-
ate distress are encouraged to self-refer to their local 
‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ (IAPT) 
service, for brief, evidence-based, psychological interven-
tions [49]. Adults with high levels of distress and all CYP 
are contacted by telephone, and referred to CYP or adult 
mental health services as appropriate. The Hub clini-
cal team consists of degree-level recovery workers, who 
have received brief training around trauma and clinical 
records systems, and senior clinicians. Senior clinicians 
are clinical psychologists or therapists experienced in 
CBT or EMDR, and typically seconded from NHS mental 
health trusts around GM.
Objectives and theoretical perspectives
A clinical outcomes evaluation is presented elsewhere 
[50]. The objectives of this process evaluation were:
• A logic model describing the resources and planning 
actions, necessary to implement parts of the seven-
step model;
• A process evaluation relating procedures [51] and 
context [52] to programmatic outcomes (numbers 
screened and in receipt of support);
• An evaluation of how well Hub practices were 
embedded and sustained, using Normalisation Pro-
cess Theory (NPT) [53, 54], a sociological theory of 
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the middle range [55, 56]. This sociological concept 
of ‘normalisation’ should not be confused with the 
highly relevant psychiatric concept of ‘normalisa-
tion’, also discussed in the text, which refers to under-
standing intrusive and distressing thoughts as a natu-
ral part of cognitive processing while recovering from 
a trauma [38, 39].
Methods
Study design
Holistic single-case design with the unit of analysis at 
the level of the programme [57]. A Consolidated crite-
ria for Reporting Qualitative studies (COREQ) check-
list is provided as Additional file 1.
Development of programme theory
During the planning of the psychosocial response and 
its evaluation, a programme theory, expressing path-
ways essential for its success [58–60], was developed and 
revised through literature review, articulation of mental 
models, and interviews [61]. A logic model (Fig. 1), was 
drafted to express the programme theory in diagram-
matic form [62, 63], with planning actions, resources and 
implementation actions based on Flynn’s Leadership in 
Disasters framework [7]. The grey shaded areas represent 
Resilience Hub-specific activities in the recovery phase 
(equivalent to Table 2, Step 5).
Selection and withdrawal of evaluation participants
Key informants were drawn from the public sector (NHS, 
Education) and the Voluntary, Community and Social 
Enterprise (VCSE) sector (specialist charities dealing 
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Fig. 1 Idealised logic model for the wider collaboration. In the case study, the absence of a planning phase meant that planning actions were 
completed during the response phase. RAG Red-Amber-Green
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with mental health or support of those affected by crime 
and terrorism). We sampled those involved in set up and 
planning (‘leaders’) and frontline workers (involved in 
implementation) for maximum variation [64] based on 
organisation and programme role. Further participants 
were sampled theoretically [65] based on information 
arising from the initial interviews. This included the use 
of snowball sampling [66] to confirm discrepant or diver-
gent views [67].
Participants were directly invited, by telephone, e-mail, 
or face-to-face, sent the information sheet, consent form 
and Resilience Hub logic model. Four leaders expressed 
willingness to be interviewed, but were unavailable dur-
ing the evaluation period. Another declined on the basis 
of not being closely enough involved. The final sample 
(Table  3) comprised 21 leaders and six frontline Hub 
workers (n = 6).
Procedures
For leaders, DH conducted consent and interviews by 
telephone; for frontline staff, KA conducted these pro-
cesses face-to-face or by telephone. Bespoke interview 
guides (Additional file  2) were developed for this study. 
Questions for leaders were based on a conceptual frame-
work [55, 56] for ordering the actions and roles of leaders 
in disasters [7] and a synthetic framework summarising 
published theories of how organisations successfully col-
laborate [68]. Leaders were also asked to give feedback 
on the logic model. The topic guide for frontline workers 
contained questions based on NPT [53] and an abbrevi-
ated cognitive task analysis [69]. Interviews, which took 
a median of 69 (38–107) minutes, were digitally recorded 
on an encrypted machine and fully transcribed. Field 
notes were taken during and after interviews as required.
We used NVivo 11 (QSR International), to support 
a National Centre for Social Research ‘Framework’ 
approach to analysis [70]. DH and KA undertook all 
stages of the analysis of transcripts: familiarisation; iden-
tifying a thematic framework; indexing; charting; and, 
mapping and interpretation. Interviews were coded to 
the conceptual/theoretical frameworks that informed the 
relevant topic guides (Fig. 2), with one leader interview—
which had a particular bearing on implementation—also 
coded within NPT [53]. Sample quotes coded to each 
construct of the conceptual/theoretical frameworks 
can be found in Additional file  3. DH and KA coded a 
sample of the transcripts, before conferring with other 
authors that the interpretations were plausible. In the 
results, logic model pathways are used to structure the 
responses of leaders which mainly related to the response 
stage. Minutes of meetings were consulted to enhance 
our understanding of the process and, where we found 
the over-lapping subject matter, we cross-referenced our 
findings with those of the Kerslake Report on the wider 
response to the incident [35].
Results
We cross-refer to critical pathways on the logic model 
(Fig.  1) using hash (#) and arrow symbols. The logic 
model is idealised and simplified, including one element 
which should be undertaken, but was not (#2), and ele-
ments which were not in place until the recovery phase 
(#11–#14, #19, #22–#25). Findings associated with the 
Inter-Agency Collaboration Framework are detailed in 
Fig. 3; further explanation of the terms used in Fig. 3, and 
illustrative quotes, are given in Table 4.
Context
(Fig. 3.1). A collaborative spirit deriving from the HSCP 
(Fig.  3.4, 8) was evident in the close working relation-
ships with counterparts at other organisations, the abil-
ity to ‘learn by doing’ [68] or ‘muddle through’ [71, 72] 
Table 3 Interviewees
Role Organisation
National expert in trauma in young people Academia
Lead commissioner GM health and social care
Lead for strategy and system development GM health and social care
Clinical lead, trauma service NHS mental health trust
Mental health lead (children and young 
people)
NHS mental health trust
Director of operations (CAMHS) NHS mental health trust
Service co-ordinator, trauma service NHS mental health trust
Medical director NHS mental health trust
Director of Nursing and Governance NHS mental health trust
Professional and clinical lead NHS mental health trust
Director of psychological services (CAMHS) NHS mental health trust
Operational manager, mental health service NHS mental health trust
Mental health lead (adults) NHS mental health trust/
Strategic clinical network
Associate director Strategic clinical network
Mental health lead (children and young 
people)
Strategic clinical network
Quality improvement manager (CAMHS) Strategic clinical network
Clinical lead Strategic clinical network
National lead Third section organisation
CEO Third sector organisation
CEO Third sector organisation
CEO Third sector organisation
Recovery worker Manchester Resilience Hub
Administration and project management Manchester Resilience Hub
Senior clinician (adults) Manchester Resilience Hub
Senior clinician (adults) Manchester Resilience Hub
Senior clinician (children and young people) Manchester Resilience Hub
Senior clinician (children and young people) Manchester Resilience Hub
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(Fig. 3.8), and the “muscle memory” (S03/F02) of part-
nership working, in pursuit of collaborative advantage 
[73, 74]. Commissioners were ambivalent about market 
mechanisms:
I don’t feel I need to worry about competitions… 
my job becomes one of finding the legal and other 
mechanisms to allow people to cooperate and work 
together (S03-F01).
The perceived status and legitimacy of leaders from 
existing networks, the HSCP and SCN, were critical in 
integrating the psychosocial response in the response 
phase (Fig.  4), in the absence of pre-incident planning 
(Fig.  3.3, 7). Under the UK Civil Contingencies Act, 
2004, statutory responder services are obliged to con-
duct contingency planning through Local Resilience 
Forums (LRFs) [75]. GM LRF had not developed men-
tal health response systems and mental health service 
providers were not included in pre-event simulations 
(Fig. 1 #2):
What was really clear immediately to me was that 
we should have been involved in the start with ‘Gold 
Command’ and that there should have been a pre-
agreed plan…something really important about 
having a regular update, in anticipation of major 
incidents of where you’ve got capacity and how you 
can draw that in quickly (S02-F06).
Planning and resources
Partnership working
An overall strategic co-ordinating group (Fig.  5) was 
attended by leaders from relevant agencies (health, 
criminal justice, etc.). At 07:30 on the day after the inci-
dent, one member of this group—the HSCP’s Execu-
tive Lead for Strategy and System Development—was 
asked to convene a ‘Recovery Group’ (Fig.  5) to inte-
grate the psychosocial response to the incident (Fig. 1, 
#1 ↔ #3 → #8 → #16). Group membership was rapidly 
extended to health, education and VCSE contexts; a 
national trauma expert and a NHSE representative also 
attended. Guided by a whole-systems approach to sup-
porting mental health difficulties [76], the Recovery 
Group attempted to harness a ‘network’ or ‘system’ to 
increase community and individual-level resilience 
during the response phase (Fig.  4). Services were frag-
mented on geographic and specialist (adult/CYPMH) 
lines with no single point of entry. So, leaders agreed 
that, during the recovery phase, they needed a more 
systematic, “robust way of screening… [and] assertively 
outreaching people… something that no other service 
was commissioned to do” (S02/F01; Fig. 1, #17/#18).
we knew that our job would be to identify the peo-
ple who needed help and make sure that their local 
NHS services or other relevant services were able 
to deliver that help and be able to… help people 
navigate through the mental health system (S02/
F04).
Lorem ipsum porta dolor sit 
amet nec
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet adipiscing. 
Donec risus dolor, porta venenatis neque 
pharetra luctus felis. Proin vel tellus nec in 
felis volutpat amet molestie cum sociis.
45 %
● Donec risus dolor porta venenatis 
● Pharetra luctus felis
● Proin vel tellus in felis volutpat 
● Molestie nec amet cum sociis
Lorem ipsum porta dolor sit 
amet nec
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet adipiscing. 
Donec risus dolor, porta venenatis neque 
pharetra luctus felis. Proin vel tellus nec in 
felis volutpat amet molestie cum sociis.
28 %
● Donec risus dolor porta venenatis 
● Pharetra luctus felis
● Proin vel tellus in felis volutpat 
● Molestie nec amet cum sociis
Lorem ipsum porta dolor sit 
amet nec
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet adipiscing. 
Donec risus dolor, porta venenatis neque 
pharetra luctus felis. Proin vel tellus nec in 
felis volutpat amet molestie cum sociis.
36 %
● Donec risus dolor porta venenatis 
● Pharetra luctus felis
● Proin vel tellus in felis volutpat 
● Molestie nec amet cum sociis
Middle range theory identifying ten 
stages of collaborative endeavour
Interagency 
collaboration
● Expectations and constraints
● Recognition of the need to collaborate
● Identification of a legitimate basis for 
collaboration
● Assessment of collaborative capacity
● Articulation of a clear sense of 
collaborative purpose
● Building up trust from principled 
conduct
● Ensuring wide organizational 
ownership
● Nurturing fragile relationships
● Selection of an appropriate 
collaborative relationship
● Selection of a pathway
Middle range theory focused on 
dynamics of implementing, 
embedding, and integrating 








Conceptual framework providing 
practical guidance for leaders in 




● Consultation to leadership
● Research
● Advocate for science/evidence
● Policy development & implementation
● Communication/information 
development & dissemination
● Systems development & integration
● Training/ education
● Direct services to victims/ survivors
● Direct services to responders/ workers
Fig. 2 Conceptual frameworks used in the study
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1. Contextual
factors
•The NHS internal market and, some mes, a blame culture, can discourage collabora on
•The recently devolved GM local government believed in collabora ve advantage & faciliated partnership working
•In ally, task omission and repe on across agencies was poorly understood.
2. Recogn on 
of need to
collaborate
•Structural, procedural, financial and professional barriers to collabora on were reported.
•Despite entrenched compe ve a udes, there was was surrender of corporate loyalty, and collabora ve
flexibility in agenda se ng and funding to achieve purpose
•VCSE sector felt insufficient recogn on of areas of interdependence and respect for domains of independence.
3. Le mate
basis
•High social importance of the project was a catalyst for collabora on
•A superordinate body - the HSCP - structured the collabora ve environment and restrained self-interest




•Exis ng collabora ve culture - networks, partnerships and inter-sector working - with sense of social purpose
•Judgements on what was a ainable eventually took into account local and na onal factors
•Some conflic ng values (psychiatric versus criminal jus ce model of vic m support)
•Change challenged exis ng prac ces of funding, tendering, staffing
5. Clear sense
of purpose
•In al broad vision focused on phased approach, with ambiguity around enactment, enabled collabora on
•'Paralysis by analysis' resulted during detail of service and job descrip ons
•VCSE vision was different, par cularly in terms of the importance of the subclinical offer (interPAR)
6. Building up 
trust
•Exis ng personal rela onships that straddled organisa ons and the use of the THRIVE model were important
•Commissioners and organisa ons went 'at risk' (financially) to expedite in a on of the resilience hub
•The VCSE sector did not agree that the right people were involved at the right me




•Recovery group was mul -sector, inter-professional
•High 'convenor le macy' in co-chairs from HSCP and SCN
•Collabora on nurtured 're culists' (those skilled at mapping/ developing policy networks)
•VCSE sector did not feel ownership
8. Nurturing
rela onships
•Leaders alert to threats to progress where collabora on challenged exis ng prac ces
•Progress characterised by 'muddling through'; high levels of trust made people 'lean in' and be suppor ve




•In the response phase, exis ng networks developed a coa onal working rela onship (the recovery group)
•The recovery phase required a unitary model of working (the centralised resilience hub) to co-ordinate work
•The response phase witnessed some debilita ve cross-checking, the recovery phase some collabora ve fa ue.
10. Selec on of
co-ordina on 
pathway
•The collabora on largely abandoned market mechanisms
•When things went well, re culists were allowed autonomy and used networks to drive collabora on on.
•The HSCP provided hierarchical and brokering func ons when the collabora ve iner a was experienced.



























Table 4 Explanations for findings in the Inter-agency Collaboration Framework [68] (shown in Fig. 3)
Concept Definition Sample quote
Task omission (3.1) Activities which are important to the collaborative objectives are 
not carried out [73]
“there’s been no support I’ve been all on my own’, many, many 
people say that from beyond Greater Manchester” (S05-F01)
Task repetition (3.1) Organisations separately carry out actions which need only be 
done by one [73]
“trying to work through where we are duplicating work again and 
again” (S04-F03)
Appreciation of interdependence (3.2) Organisations have similar goals but operate with different func-
tions in different sectors [115, 116]
“the voluntary sector work, even… some of the most clinicians 
I respect the most… think of it as being non-clinical… not as 
experts … so there was a lot of people that could have been 
plugged into really good local, targeted voluntary sector organi-
sations” (S12-F01)
Domains of independence (3.2) Organisations define activities as their specialist domain [115, 
116]
“we’re not just another charity you are that person that organisa-
tion fulfilling that statutory duty and that statutory duty should 
dovetail with the clinical mental health support and that does 
need to be recognised … It was a very difficult to get any 
acknowledgment of the existence of ourselves as an organisa-
tion with that expertise” (S05-F01)
Resource dependency (3.3) Service delivery interactions are fundamentally dependent upon 
acquiring resource [105]
“there was confusion with the centre around what … money we 
would need and where it would come through” (S03-F01)
The fulfilment of routine clinical care (3.3) Officials may be reluctant to permit new work which interferes 
with the delivery of existing programmes
“that was tricky… giving up psychological therapy staff… there 
are organisational commitments to which they are attached and 
IAPT targets” (S05-F06)
Change challenged existing practices of funding, tendering, 
staffing (3.4)
Culture can influence how strategy is made [117]. Change can 
challenge existing practices and values [118]
I don’t feel I need to worry about competitions… my job becomes 
one of finding the legal and other mechanisms to allow people 
to cooperate and work together… if I can get people to cooper-
ate why would I waste my time [with] a convoluted procure-
ment programme? (S03-F01)
We had to absolutely get staff in and second staff from other 
organisations… the whole… system that we are involved in 
doesn’t allow that to happen (S05-F06)
Initial broad vision… with ambiguity around enactment, ena-
bled collaboration (3.5)
A broad vision generates more momentum than blueprints. 
Ambiguity can make negotiation easier, serving as “the grease 
that allows decision-makers to co-operate” (p36 [119])
The main goal… we all agreed… was… minimising long-term… 
psychological difficulties… how we achieve it… was… flex-
ible… I’m not so sure anyone… explicitly said ‘this is what we’d 
like you to do’. (S01-F01)
The response phase witnessed some debilitative cross-checking 
(3.9)
“Sooner or later, someone or some organisation, will be offended 
either by the actions of another organisation or by what a core 
group has committed it to. On the other hand, paying serious 
attention to accountability can be almost as debilitating, 
because it implies a need for a continual process of checking 
in both directions” (p8 [120])
the pathways document… that was the first… real test of col-
laboration… everybody was wanting to just sort of tweak… 
odd words and nuances… somebody should have said… stop, 
let’s just get it out… Whereas… we were all… still trying to be a 
bit too polite (S02/F03)
We thought we’d made a decision but it then had to be sense 
checked by somebody else who said yes but it had to go 
through them and we didn’t quite understand why … at the 





























Concept Definition Sample quote
The HSCP provided hierarchical and brokering functions when 
the collaborative inertia was experienced (3.10)
A hierarchical model can apply where organisations with com-
mon ties are asked to work jointly in a way that would not 
usually occur on a voluntary basis [121]. This approach may 
depend on an executive body using its “position in the flow of 
resources to specify the nature of programmes and linkages at 
subordinate levels” [68]
there’s… inevitably some competition… some… sense of… 
whose view is best when there are differing views… there 
was… a little bit of… tension between providers… a bit of 
reverting to type… that was brokered… by the partnership and 
by the commissioners (S02/F03)
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The Recovery Group convened task-and-finish subgroups 
on communication workforce and clinical pathways 
(Fig.  1, #4, #5, #6,). Psychoeducation and informative 
content were rapidly tailored into factsheets and com-
munications strategies, ensuring that messages were 
evidence-based and effectively worded [77] (Fig.  1, 
#4 → #10). Based on the guidance of experts in the field, 
national guidance from 2006 [36] was modified to allow 
highly targeted, evidence-based early intervention [78] 
(Fig. 1, #6,). Published and unpublished data from differ-
ent mass casualty incidents were considered (Table 1, [3, 
79–86]), especially those from Omagh [87, 88], because 
of the number of children involved and the length of 
follow-up.
The development of the Resilience Hub
An NHS trust director of operations for CYPMH, a con-
sultant CYP psychiatrist, and the SCN Adult Mental 
Health Lead drafted clinical pathways [89, 90] for adults 
and CYP, harmonised to allow for a family-oriented 
approach and avoid a ‘postcode lottery’. They proposed 
that all local mental health care providers would provide 
trauma therapy-trained staff to a telephone/email-based 
screening/outreach programme (the ‘Resilience Hub’). 
Part-time secondments would preserve capacity in, and 
disseminate staff learning across, the system. An NHS 
trust Clinical and Professional Lead for Psychological 
Therapies and a consultant CYP psychiatrist identified 
bank IAPT staff trained in EMDR, trauma-focussed 
CBT and family therapy (Fig. 1, #5 → #13). An NHS trust 
Director of Operations for CYPMH and the SCN Men-
tal Health Lead submitted a business case for the Resil-
ience Hub to commissioners on a third committee, the 
Critical Incident Board (Fig.  5), covering the costs of 
workforce, training, infrastructure, screening, commu-
nications (Fig. 1, #11-#14, #17-#19). Following the devel-
opment of the business case the Critical Incident Board 
approved the pathways after revisions, and handled con-
tracting. GM CCGs and the HSCP agreed to underwrite 
£2.3 m for 3 years of screening and active support from 
June 2017 until funds from central government could be 
secured. The speed of decision making from the local 
system was crucial in enabling the hub to mobilise and 
commence screening at the 3  month time point. The 
activity was linked to an extension of an existing contract 
between the provider trust and one of their commission-
ers, who took on contract/performance reviews.
The HSCP approached the ticketing company for the 
names, addresses and e-mail addresses of those who had 
bought the 20,000 tickets (#8 → #9), for assertive out-
reach use by the Hub (#9 → #17). Precise specification of 
the purposes of use meant it took Caldicott guardians—
senior individuals responsible for protecting the confi-
dentiality of identifiable health and care data in the NHS 
[91]—and others seven weeks to finalise the data-sharing 
agreement.
Weeks 7-








MH providers identify 
staff for secondment
Procure IT / Estates
Develop contractual / 
governance 
infrastructure
Develop the Hub clinical 
offer
19 June-2 July 2018
Weeks 3-4
MH staff supported 
positive media 
messages
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– SCN ’s / GM partners 
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Subject matter experts 
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following attack on 
London Bridge
Information gathering




MH support to 
inpatients and hospital 
staff
MH support to schools/ 
colleges
MH helpline for 
professionals mobilised
Coming together of all 
partners informally
22-24 May 2017
Fig. 4 Timeline (response phase)
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The Service Co-ordinator and a consultant clinical 
psychologist from the veteran’s mental health service 
and a CAMHS Operations Director led the set-up of 
the Hub (Fig.  1, #1 → #11/#12). A room with appro-
priate cabling was secured. The ‘Patient Case Man-
agement Information System’ (PCMIS, University of 
York, York), already in use by the veteran’s service, was 
modified to capture screening data and support triage 
(#18 → #22 → #23).
Criticisms of the partnership working
The majority of VCSE leaders believed that the Recov-
ery Group duplicated existing work and involved them 
insufficiently and brought them in too late to affect 
the design work. All of the VCSE leaders felt that 
the Recovery Group failed to understand their sec-
tor’s assets (Fig.  1, #1 ↔ #3 → #8 → #16; Fig.  3.1, 2, 6, 
7). The majority believed the central offer “failed to 
take into account people with subclinical need” (S05/
F01) in line with Ministry of Justice guidance [92]: 
the Recovery Group decided they did not have the 
evidence or resources to deliver something like the 
International Program for Promoting Adjustment and 
Resilience (interPAR) model [93] (Fig. 3.5).
Implementation actions
Partnership working
The Recovery Group held teleconferences, initially daily 
then weekly, often with over fifty attendees. Delegates 
provided situation reports from, and disseminated infor-
mation out to, health, education and VCSE service con-
texts (Fig. 1, #15 ↔ #16; Fig. 6). They developed a register 
of those affected (Fig.  1, #8 → #9), including those sup-
ported by:
• hospitals and emergency services;
• police family liaison officers or bereavement counsel-
lors,;
• Rapid Assessment, Interface and Discharge (RAID) 
teams, specialist mental health services working in 
acute hospitals [94];
• college counsellors; or,
• charities/family liaison officers.
Outreach
Specialist mental health providers offered support to 
patients, families and professionals at major acute hos-
pitals in receipt of the injured (#25). In interviews, it 
was reported that health professionals caring for the 
Business Operations Group (Operational):
In the response phase this ‘Critical Incident Board’
developed and oversaw the initial ad hoc mental health 
response. It negotiated with the pathways group and finally 
approved initial funding for the resilience hub, overseeing 
contract monitoring into the recovery phase.
03
● Medical Directors of two mental health trusts [Chairs]
● Adult Mental Health Clinical Lead for Strategic Clinical Network
● Strategic Lead Clinical Commissioner for Mental Health across the Metropolitan 
Association of Local Clinical Commissioning Groups
The Recovery Group (Strategic and Tactical): 
In the response phase, this ‘Recovery Group’ had strategic 
functions in its pathways and communications subgroups. It 
linked with London teams dealing with other incidents. In 
tactical terms it co-ordinated the inter-sector response and 
information flow. In the recovery phase, as the ‘Quarterly 
Partnership Group’, it had tactical oversight of the resilience 
hub, liaising with NHS England, over out-of-area referral.
02
● Executive Lead – St rategy & System Development., Greater Manchester Health and 
Social Care Partnership [Chair]
● Strategic Clinical Network Manager [Chair]
● Service Coordinator for the Veteran Service & Resilience Hub Service Lead
● Adult Mental Health Clinical Lead for Strategic Clinical Network
● Consultant Children's and Young Person Psychiatrist, national clinical lead for 
children and young people
Gold Command (Strategic): 
The Strategic Co-ordinating Group. As mental health had not 
been considered as part of the preparedness phase, and few 
members of the panel had any relevant expertise, this 
strategic function was immediately delegated the Recovery 
Group (see next tier).
01
● Chief Officer and Executive Lead for Strategy & System Development, Greater 
Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership
● Local Authority
● Police
Fig. 5 Three committees involved in the response phase
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wounded had no systematic support as they came off-
shift. NHS occupational health departments would not 
allow mental health services to contact staff directly 
which “compromised” (S02/F03) the fidelity of the pro-
posed care model; NHS staff were described as often 
“very wary of their own occupational health depart-
ment” (S02-F06). Employers and RAID teams made 
‘backdoor’ referrals but some interviewees felt that ad 
hoc support systems, such as a drop-in centre and help-
line, were not well used; affected professionals tended 
to “minimise” and resort to presenteeism, possibly due 
to cultural factors including stigma [12–15].
Phased self-help information was sent out 
(#10 → #17), two and six weeks after the incident, 
through traditional media, social media, websites and 
schools. Statutory sector interviewees reported diffi-
culty getting messages out ‘intact’ outside of the region 
and were concerned that the media’s coverage might 
be counter-productive [95–97]. Information for health 
professionals was disseminated via splash screens, 
pop-up software windows, to local NHS staff via their 
intranet.
In the absence of ticketing data, the Recovery Group 
was initially unaware that the majority of those affected 
were living outside of Manchester (pp. 111–112, [35]). 
The VCSE sector and family liaison officers supported 
some of the underserved into sharing experiences on a 
social networking service, and protesting at the absence 
of support (Fig.  6). Recovery Group members went to 
great lengths to, “get an equity of response outside of 
Manchester” (S02-F06) including asking companies who 
provided travel to the concert to fund private therapy 
(Fig. 1, #26). NHSE teleconferenced with strategic clinical 
networks in other areas of the country to address barriers 
to care and disseminate advice/materials (#16 → #17).
Training
With particular expertise in blast injury trauma, the 
Veteran’s Service played an immediate role in educating 
local clinical networks. Trauma-focused therapists and 
accredited supervisors were in short supply, so bespoke 
training workshops were arranged for CBT and EMDR 
trauma therapists (#6 → #14 → #19). Oversubscribed, the 
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Fig. 6 Simplified information flow within the response system. Information flow within the response system prior to setup of the Resilience Hub 
(the majority of listed organisations also communicated information to the public)
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Professions Network on a password protected web-
page. At the time of writing, mental health providers 
were considering accessing training on the delivery of 
Schwartz Rounds [98–100] to help staff address the emo-
tional aspects of work and preserve staff mental health 
(#19 → #27).
Inappropriate care from outside of the system
All statutory sector interviewees expressed concern 
about the inappropriate, early use of active therapies 
[101–103] (#15 ↔ #16). They felt their normalisation 
messages, such as “it’s okay not to feel okay”, calmed 
the impulse to ‘just do something’ [104] amongst health 
workers. They reported challenging unregulated groups 
from overseas (pp. 48, 111, 120 [35]) who had re-trauma-
tised people through inappropriate early intervention:
I went to a meeting… to …bring together voluntary 
sector groups …every time we sat at a table with 
this particular group they got up and left, so they 
wouldn’t be challenged by us… some of those peo-
ple [treated by the VCSE group] subsequently have 
come to the Hub and been quite damaged by what 
they were offered… (S02-F06).
Process outcomes
Reach
Systematic process outcome data collection was only 
undertaken as part of the Resilience Hub. There is disa-
greement on why the launch of the Resilience Hub was 
delayed, but there was late consideration of model’s 
appropriateness by senior civil servants, locally and 
nationally. The delay prevented a planned six-week mail-
out. Before the 3-month mailout, Hub procedures were 
piloted with first responders and some of the individuals 
who had protested at poor service access. At 31/07/2018, 
1  year after the first mailout, over 7000 emails had 
been sent, inviting ticket purchasers and those referred 
from partner organisations to complete screening 
(#9 → #17 → #21). Of these, 3281 had completed screen-
ing (#22), 602 (18.3%) aged 0–15 years on that date, 275 
(8.4%) aged 16–17 years and 2375 (72.4%) aged 18 years 
or over. At 31/07/2018, 79% of the individuals supported 
by the Resilience Hub lived outside of Greater Manches-
ter. At 10/05/19, 66% of Hub clients had received individ-
ual phone and/or email support (#24). Table 5 illustrates 
the proportions of adults and CYP who had clinically 
significant screening questionnaire scores upon registra-
tion with the Hub. Hub staff, other clinicians, the police 
and VCSE workers also ran a series of targeted events 
for CYP, adults, and families, focused on normalising 
trauma responses, impact on relationships, connecting 
with those who have similar experiences, posttraumatic 
growth and resilience-building (#25).
Governance
The Recovery Group continued as quarterly Resilience 
Hub Partnership Board, with a remit of: developing the 
Hub’s role; sharing intelligence on those affected; gauging 
pressures on staff wellbeing; resource use; giving voices 
to service users and stakeholders; building an evidence 
base and reporting mechanism. One VCSE interviewee 
characterised data presentations at the Partnership Board 
as “opaque”:
“mainly about … how many people have filled in the 
questionnaire and it’s really hard to work out how 
many people have actually had how much one-to-
one support” (S05/F01).
Leader evaluation
The psychosocial response inevitably involved reconfigu-
ration of scarce resources and tensions in responding to a 
surge in demand (Fig. 3.2, 3):
Table 5 Proportion of  adults and  CYP at  baseline 
with  clinically significant mental health questionnaire 
scores, comparing Hub clients who registered within 3, 6, 
and 9 months of the attack
PHQ-9: % with scores of 10 or more, indicating moderate to severe depression 
[45]
GAD-7: % with scores of 10 or more, indicating moderate to severe anxiety [122]
WSAS: % with scores of 11 or more, indicating significant to severe functional 
impairment [46]
TSQ: % with scores of 6 or more, indicating possible PTSD [43]
CRIES-8: % with scores of 17 or more, indicating possible PTSD [123]
Each RCADs scale scored according to child’s age and gender. % with T-scores of 
70 or higher, indicating scores above the clinical threshold [124]











PHQ-9 34.50 50.00 49.80
GAD-7 36.60 49.80 55.80
WSAS 41.50 61.20 58.40
TSQ 51.10 67.50 68.20
CYP—Baseline
CRIES-8 84.20 82.90 92.90
RCADS Depression 13.00 21.00 17.40
RCADS GAD 19.90 23.10 35.30
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the message I sent out… was you will prioritise these 
folk because there is an evidence base whereby they 
are more vulnerable… I’m not overriding NHS rules 
about clinical priority what I was doing was on the 
base of clinical need (S03-F01).
a young girl was due to go to the concert… couldn’t 
make it because of an anxiety disorder, her friends 
went to the concert… ended up with CAMHS 
appointments… (S11/F01).
knowing what capacity we’ve got in the system … 
and how can it be freed, whilst also ensuring that 
your core business happens day to day because there 
was a backlash – minor – but there were some peo-
ple who felt that this was this was taking staff away 
from basic core business (S02-F06).
when we second these staff into the Hub… it was dif-
ficult because… there’s a huge amount of pressure 
from… GM [for] hitting targets in IAPT.
As we have noted, VCSE sector interviewees all had 
criticisms of the programme, although two balanced this 
with praise: “everybody has … done an incredibly amaz-
ing job considering the size and scale of incident” (S11/
F01). Statutory sector interviewees were overwhelm-
ingly positive about the collaboration. All stressed (Fig. 3) 
how existing “system relationships” (S04-F02), and the 
social importance of the work [105] meant that people 
“leant in” (S09/F01). Any “reverting to type” (S02/F03)—
for instance competition over ownership of work—was 
swiftly brokered by the “was brokered… by the partner-
ship and by the commissioners” (S02/F03).
we were brought together because of the severity of 
the incident… and we managed to put aside our 
vested interest… by not collaborating you would 
just… allow a system to maintain its cracks through 
which people will fall. (S05-F06).
Interviews with Resilience Hub workers
Coherence: did the intervention make sense and ‘fit’?
Findings based on the NPT are summarised in Fig. 7; a 
Resilience-Hub-level logic model is provided in Fig.  8. 
Hub staff distinguished the Hub from other NHS ser-
vices as “an all age service” with “a real focus on families 
that is aspirational in other services” (S02-F07). They 
described needing to convey their shared understanding 
of the Hub’s work to clients and other services, particu-
larly around the Hub’s limited role in treatment. Staff had 
a clear sense of what was required of them, although sev-
eral noted that this often changed. All constructed simi-
lar value for the Hub’s work:
it’s invaluable…the majority of clients…if I hadn’t 
have made that referral they wouldn’t be in services 
(S02/009).
SENSE-MAKING
Resilience Hub staff: 
• Distinguish between the 
Hub and typical NHS 
mental health services
• Agree on its aims, 
objectives and expected 
benefits 
• Have a clear sense of what 
is required of them, even 
when tasks change over 
time due to the evolving 
nature of the Hub
• Had to work to clarify the 
purpose of the Hub to both 
clients and other NHS 
services
PARTICIPATION
Resilience Hub staff: 
• Passionately support the 
Hub & its work
• Feel that the Hub’s 
supportive staff team has 
been vital to its success
• Believe key individuals 
drove the implementation 
forward, however service 
users & emergency 
services could have had 
more input into its setup
• Found that there was not 
always sufficient cover 
when staff were 
seconded
ACTION
Resilience Hub staff: 
• Strengthen team 
relationships & confidence 
in each other, e.g. through 
skills sharing
• Have sufficient skills to 
deliver the Hub’s work
• Encounter critical barriers 
to accessing psychological 
therapies for clients, e.g.
• Inflexible referral 
pathways
• Limited capacity in some 
areas, particularly in 




Resilience Hub staff: 
• Record informal feedback 
from clients & collect 
formal data, e.g. case note 
audits; client feedback 
surveys
• Evaluate the Hub very 
positively, although 
limitations included use of 
telephone assessments for 
people with complex needs
• Note the Hub’s 
responsiveness to changing 
needs, e.g. home visits for 
complex cases; providing 
therapy when local 
services were at 
capacity
Fig. 7 Findings based on normalisation process theory
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Participation: how engaged and committed were providers?
Key individuals with expertise in working with adults, 
CYPs, trauma, leading services and commissioning drove 
forward the implementation of the Hub. Representation 
of non-NHS organisations on the Hub steering group was 
praised but representation of service-users and the emer-
gency services (themselves service users) was felt to be 
insufficient by some. Staff described feeling “honoured” 
(S02/F07) or “privileged” (S02/F10) to work at the Hub; 
one related that insufficient cover in their permanent role 
had negatively impact on their working and personal life. 
All felt that it appropriate for them to be at the Hub, and 
that the supportive atmosphere kept them engaged.
Collective action: did the change occur and who did what?
Hub project management was responsive to lessons 
learnt and changing needs. As a result, informing 
staff on part-time secondment of changes to processes 
could be difficult. Team members, typically specialised 
in either CYP or adult work, built confidence in each 
other and the all-age model of work by sharing knowl-
edge and skills. With training, peer support, and fre-
quently updated processes, staff generally felt they had 
the relevant skills, although some outlined unmet train-
ing needs in, for instance, dealing with the media. Most 
participants described the Hub’s interface with other 
NHS services as the most difficult aspect the Hub’s 
work, for example, having to grasp the processes and 
eligibility criteria for services across the UK:
we’d spend quite a lot of time in the early days…
trawling through websites and ringing service after 
service to find out which was the most appropri-
ate…it was a lot of leg work (S02/009).
Hub workers had to gain credibility with GPs and local 
services in order to progress clients’ referrals. All par-
ticipants described arranging access to trauma-focused 
interventions as the most time-consuming part of the 
job, particularly for clients living outside of Manchester.
trying to help people access the support they need 
in a timely fashion, has been a big frustration…I 
think the sticking points are, it seems to be about 
the capacity within services that we refer to. (S02/
F10).
Key barriers included inflexible pathways that would only 
accept self- or GP referrals. The widespread geographical 
reach of the client base highlighted the variable provision 
of specialist therapy across the UK. Local service capac-
ity was sometimes limited or non-existent; waiting times 
often exceeded NICE guidelines. Access was particularly 
difficult for CYPs, as “there’s no standardised waiting 





- Leaflets, e.g. in GP surgeries
Mental health screening using standardized, validated 
psychological measures
Community support through consultaon with schools, police, 
media etc
ADULTS:
Mild distress: Connued monitoring; offered telephone support 
and self-help informaon
Moderate distress: As per mild distress + given IAPT self-referral 
informaon
Severe distress: Contacted by telephone; referred to specialist 
services as appropriate
CYPs: All CYPs/parents contacted by telephone; referrals to 
specialist CAMHS services when necessary
Staff training/educaon/supervision
Staff address emoonal aspects of work through daily group 
supervision/clinical check-in; regular individual clinical supervision; 
Schwartz Rounds
Clinical advocacy where 
necessary; consisng of 
senior negoaon around 
waing mes & access to 
evidenced intervenons
Face-to-face group events 
(e.g. families; children & 
young people; adults) with 
some clients
As of April 2019, in addion to compleng regular screening 
quesonnaires, 66% of the Hub’s clients also received phone/ 
email support 
Fig. 8 Logic model for Resilience Hub workers
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Reflexive monitoring: what change occurred—why or why 
not?
Processes were refined through data collection exercises, 
such as case note audits, that staff reviewed together. Cli-
ent surveys generally returned positive feedback, and 
staff recorded informal client feedback. Staff acknowl-
edged that the trajectory of clinical outcomes was dif-
ficult to attribute to the Hub. Participants evaluated the 
Hub very positively. A consistent observation was the 
Hub’s responsive and evolving nature. Continual service 
reconfiguration was needed to respond to the chang-
ing needs of clients and to emergent limitations, such as 
introducing home visits in response to the limitations 
of using telephone assessments for people with complex 
needs. Hub staff began to see clients for therapy “when 
we realised that some of the services in the North West 
weren’t able to meet the timescales for treatment and that 
people really struggle.” (S02/F13).
Discussion
This process evaluation expands upon and adds to the 
findings of the Kerslake Report. The findings are dis-
cussed below, with particular reference to their implica-
tions for actions and policy.
Planning and resources
The Greater Manchester response was generally viewed 
positively, considering the Local Resilience Forum’s 
plans for major incidents did not include mental health 
support (p197, [35]). In line with the Kerslake Review, 
“Emergency plans for major incidents should incorporate 
comprehensive contingencies for the provision of mental 
health support” (p. 197, [35]). In Manchester, trauma-
focused therapists and accredited supervisors were in 
short supply; we therefore add that emergency planning 
should include regular assessment of workforce capacity, 
the production of on-call rotas, and anticipatory training. 
Simulation exercises are essential to test local arrange-
ments for co-ordination and delivery of the mental health 
response and address any identified gaps.
The financial impact on the local health economy of 
setting up the Hub is much bigger than areas would be 
able to absorb. There needs to be agreement between 
local and national commissioners and strategic leads as 
to how additional funding is identified in a timely man-
ner to ensure appropriate resourcing of the mental health 
response.
Data and information sharing
Considerable efforts were necessary to identify and 
approach those affected with offers of mental health 
support, although the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 
2004 allows the suspension of normal data protection 
procedures and the sharing of individual identifiable 
data. “Responders have a duty to share information with 
partner organisations” (p15, [77]) and “should be robust 
in asserting their power to share personal data lawfully in 
emergency planning, response and recovery situations” 
(p8, [106]).
Pre-existing partnership and network arrangements 
enabled swift, research-based development of policy, 
messages and materials. Up to date materials should be 
made accessible by the NHS England EPPR team. Local 
government websites can be of variable quality as strate-
gic communicative tools for the promotion of resilience 
[107], and the integrity of their information should be 
regularly assessed.
Collaborative working
The basic seven-step model for designing and deliver-
ing the psychosocial response to a disaster (Table 2) [8] 
is unaffected by this evaluation, which reinforces the 
need to engage the right people at the right time. In this 
regard, the VCSE and statutory sectors have mutually 
corrective roles in providing routes for people in need to 
appropriate care (Table 2, Step 4).
Statutory sector leaders raised concerns about the 
inappropriate delivery of early therapy by some VCSE 
workers; the majority of VCSE leaders believed the health 
sector’s model resulted in unmet need in those whose 
symptom severity was below clinical thresholds for treat-
ment. This predictable conflict over scope and status [68], 
was ameliorated in some parts of the response network 
through a culture of collaboration and close working 
relationships between sectors. The VCSE sector and the 
NHS outside of Greater Manchester remained less well 
integrated into the response network, despite efforts to 
improve information flow or referral quality and time.
The Home Office’s Victims of Terrorism Unit has been 
tasked with identifying and consolidating support path-
ways for those affected by terrorist attacks, and since the 
incident a VCS pathway has been developed for organi-
sations including  3rd Sector building on the work from 
Manchester and London.
Leadership and workforce development
The development of the psychosocial and mental health 
response to the Manchester Arena attack has required 
leaders to communicate across organisational boundaries 
to deliver a shared vision working across agencies and 
systems. The Resilience Hub has provided an opportunity 
to develop trauma-based expertise within GM includ-
ing the provision of training and resources. Staffing has 
initially relied on secondment of existing clinicians from 
across GM. Long-term sustainability of the Hub model 
will need to be considered, particularly on stepping down 
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to local services. Trauma training and workforce devel-
opment is required across community and specialist ser-
vices in preparation for any future major incident.
Practical support for professionals and first respond-
ers should be integrated into response and recovery 
phases, and pathways developed to ensure that offers 
of support reach the people who may be affected. Cul-
tural factors are likely to affect professionals in report-
ing mental health symptoms and engaging with mental 
health services. Subsequently, senior managers, HR and 
occupational health should consider formal and informal 
opportunities to support staff including; debriefs, drop-
ins, Schwartz Rounds and support via primary care and 
community services so that services are sustainable over 
the long-term.
Further research
Evaluation of the longitudinal trajectories of participants’ 
mental health responses to the Arena incident is planned, 
through a retrospective case series using individuals’ 
screening scores at multiple time points post-incident. 
Cohorts of individuals will be identified according to 
mental health trajectory, client group (CYPs, adults, and 
professionals), and time at which clients registered with 
the Hub. The Hub’s acceptability and economic impact 
will be assessed.
Taking the Kerslake Review’s findings on board, further 
research is needed to understand the range of individual 
reasons why some individuals had not received mental 
health report several months after the review and why 
some of those who did found the response unacceptable.
The sudden nature of contingencies makes research-
ing the response to them difficult [108, 109]. However, 
employing national research infrastructure, studies can 
be prearranged and left in ‘hibernation’ pending an inci-
dent [110]. Researchers should plan research to under-
stand how the materials and processes designed by the 
Resilience Hub can be implemented in a shorter time 
period, involving national authorities and research infra-
structure organisations.
Conclusions
All statutory sector and all but one third-sector inter-
viewees considered the Resilience Hub a success given 
the absence of pre-event planning. Lessons, particularly 
regarding system development and integration, have 
been outlined, and implications for planning and pol-
icy explored. Any response to large-scale trauma must 
include an appropriately resourced mental health com-
ponent embedded within the emergency response plan 
(EPRR), including consideration of support for profes-
sionals and first responders. The response should include 
all key stakeholders including local and national third 
sector agencies. The ability to transcend organisational 
and agency boundaries is crucial and requires leader-
ship, collaborative working and an infrastructure to sup-
port data sharing and governance through pre-agreed 
arrangements. 
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